摘要
控制权私利的隧道行为和隐蔽特征源于信息的不透明。本文首次系统地从信息透明度角度,研究信息透明度与控制权私利的关系。研究表明,法律制度与媒体信息披露能够显著抑制控制权私利,企业每股收益和两权分离度与控制权私利呈显著正相关关系,而总市值则呈显著负相关。这表明,控股股东实施两权分离或者向上市公司输送利润,其真实目的就是为了攫取控制权私利;而扩大企业规模,则能够显著抑制控股股东攫取私利。
The tunneling behavior and concealment of private benefits of control are generatedcome from the non-transparency of information.This article,for the first time,systematically studies the relationship between information transparency and private benefits of control.The analysis shows that legal system and disclosure of media can substantially inhibit private benefits of control.It also finds that companies' earnings per share(EPS) and extent of separation between ownership and management are positively related to private benefits of control,while total market value of shares is significantly related in the negative way.This indicates that the true purpose of controlling shareholders adopting separation between ownership and management or tunneling profits to listed companies is to obtain private benefits of control;and that expanding.Expanding the scale of companies can largelysignificantly restrain this behavior.
出处
《中国注册会计师》
北大核心
2011年第12期60-65,2,共6页
The Chinese Certified Public Accountant
