基于利益集团博弈的商会治理研究被引量：3

Research on Governance of Chamber of Commerce Based on Games among Interest Groups

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摘要政府、企业群和商会三大利益集团的博弈,决定了商会的治理。商会的治理主要包含三个层面,一是商会的生成治理,涉及企业群与政府之间的博弈;二是商会的内部治理,涉及企业群与商会之间的博弈;三是商会的外部治理,涉及政府与商会之间的博弈。政府、企业群和商会两两之间的博弈,均形成不同的组合,反映了现实中我国商会生成、内部规范发展和外部规范发展的多元或复杂情况。 The games among government, firms and chamber of commerce decide the governance of chamber of commerce. The governance of chamber of commerce includes three aspects. The first one is generation governance of chamber of commerce which involves the games between firms and government. The second one is internal governance of chamber of commerce which involves the games between firms and chamber of commerce. The third one is external governance of chamber of commerce which involves the games between government and chamber of commerce. The games of government,finns and chamber of commerce form different combinations which reflect the Multivariate or Complicated Conditions of generation governance, internal governance and external governance of chamber of commerce in practice.

作者冯巨章

机构地区华南师范大学

出处《中国经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期75-83,共9页 China Economic Studies

基金教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:11YJC790040) 广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(项目编号:11JDXM79003)"基于合法性视角的商会规制与企业社会责任演化研究:广东的实践和案例" 广东省软科学研究计划项目(项目编号:2011B070300108)

关键词商会治理利益集团博弈 chamber of commerce governance interest groups game

分类号 F203 [经济管理—国民经济]

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