摘要
工程施工项目经理的选择对项目的成败起到至关重要的作用,为了减少项目经理逆向选择或隐藏信息行为的发生,研究了逆向选择下工程施工企业对项目经理的最优激励合同问题,给出了能够诱导项目经理如实报告其真实能力的逆向选择模型。研究表明,与对称信息下的最优合约相比,项目经理能力越高、合同要求其最优努力水平越高,其所得报酬应越多。高能力项目经理在信息对称和逆向选择两种情况下的最优努力水平相同,且逆向选择下能够获得信息租金;低能力项目经理逆向选择下最优努力水平向下扭曲。
Discussed an optimal incentive contract to project managers in an adverse selection condition, and proposed an adverse selection model which could induce a project manager to show his/her actual ability. The results indicate that compared with symmetric information, the principal demands more efforts and pays more remuneration to the agent with high ability; optimal effort level of high ability managers would be the same in both cases; low ability managers＇ effort level would be lower than before. Additionally, in the condition of adverse selection, the manager with high ability would receive information rents.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2011年第6期666-669,共4页
Journal of Engineering Management
关键词
委托-代理
逆向选择
项目经理
合同设计
principal-agent theory
adverse selection
project manager
contract design
