摘要
Visa的"封堵"威胁源于两点:一是其境内市场战略遭遇严重挫折,二是中国银联境外受理网络不断扩张侵蚀了其境外清算收益。但本文的分析表明,在境内人民币银行卡清算市场准入终将放开这一假设预期基础上,"封堵"威胁是不可置信的。渐进式的结构重构应是境内人民币银行卡清算市场的结构政策选择。具体来说,短期内应维持中国银联在境内人民币银行卡清算市场的垄断地位,同时强化对中国银联的政府监管,使其基本具备应对国际银行卡组织竞争的能力,为准入的放开创造条件;尽早明确境内人民币银行卡清算市场准入放开的时间,最终放开市场准入,培育有效竞争的市场结构。
The causes of Visa＇s ＂blocking＂ threat is that its domestic market strategy has come up against serious frustration, and its overseas clearing revenue has been eroded by China UnionPay＇s expansion of overseas acceptance networks. Nevertheless, this article makes it clear that the ＂bloking＂ threat is incredible based on the hypothesis expectance that the domestic RMB bank card clearing market＇s entry will finally be deregulated. The gradual structure reconstitution should be the structure policy choice in the domestic RMB bank card clearing market. In detail, China UnionPay＇s monopoly should be maintained in short term, and at the same time, the government regulation should be enhanced so as to make China UnionPay build up the competence to compete with international bank card schemes, namely prepare for the entry＇s deregulation. And, the time of the entry＇s deregulation should be determined as soon as possible, and the entry will finally be deregulated at this time to cultivate the market structure of workable competition.
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
2011年第5期62-68,共7页
Industrial Economics Research
基金
江西省研究生创新专项资金省教育厅资助项目"平台竞争与反垄断规制--基于银行卡产业的研究"(项目编号:YC10A068)
