我国家族企业中的“人际关系网”——现状及制度诱因被引量：17

"Relationship network" in the Family Business in China Market:Current Situation and Systemic Origin

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摘要本文以新制度经济学为基础,实证考察了我国家族企业中"人际关系网"的存在性及其制度诱因。本文认为,当企业经营具有关系型交易特征时,家族成员及泛家族成员与创始人之间的相互信任关系会显著降低交易成本,提升企业关系型资产的价值。以创始人具有的政商关系以及企业与客户和供应商之间的商业网络关系作为关系型交易的衡量指标,本文对我国274家民营企业在IPO年度的3639位高管成员的分析支持上述结论,即家族企业的关系型交易特征与家族成员和泛家族成员在高管团队中的比例显著正相关。进一步的检验表明,家族成员和泛家族成员的持股比例显著高于其他高管,但年度薪酬对公司当期业绩的敏感性却显著低于其他高管。这表明,"人际关系网"导致高管激励模式更趋长期化。 Under the framework of New Institutional Economics, we find the existence and logicality of personal network in our family firms empirically. We found that the trust between the founders and their families or ＂pan-family＂ members could reduce transaction costs and further enhance the value of relationship assets when the firm＇s transaction is relationship-based. Taking the founders＇ political connection and their enterprises＇ business network as the index of relationship transaction, our results supported the findings by 274 private firms with 3639 managers in their IPO years. When the family firm＇s transaction is relationship-based, there will be more family or ＂pan-family＂ members in the management team. Furthermore, family or ＂pan-family＂ members hold higher ratio shares but lower pay-performance sensitivity than other managers, which showed the personal network will result in long-term incentive mechanism.

作者何小杨

机构地区北京大学博士后流动站中国工商银行博士后科研工作站

出处《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第11期54-66,共13页 Securities Market Herald

基金国家自然科学基金"我国民营企业家族化研究"(项目编号:70802035) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目编号:07JJD630007)"我国民营企业家族化的制度诱因和经济后果问题研究"的阶段性成果

关键词交易特征泛家族成员家族企业职业经理人市场 transaction characteristics, pan-family members, family firms, professional manager market

分类号 F271.5 [经济管理—企业管理]

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