摘要
对企业排污总量超标行为,建立了有限理性的排污企业与监管部门之间的演化博弈模型.对复制动态方程进行了分析,得到了博弈的演化稳定策略,讨论了参与者的行为如何影响演化稳定策略.最后分析了企业排污行为的原因,提出了一些合理建议.
For overproof behavior of enterprises discharging pollutants,an evolutionary game model is constructed between bounded rational pollutants discharge enterprises and supervision departments.By analyzing the duplicative dynamic equations,evolutionary stable strategies（ESS）of the game is obtained and how attendants＇ behavior influence ESS is discussed.Finally,the reasons of enterprises＇ pollutants discharge behavior are analysed and some reasonable suggestions are offered.
出处
《湖北工业大学学报》
2011年第5期110-113,共4页
Journal of Hubei University of Technology
关键词
有限理性
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
排污总量控制
bounded rationality
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable strategy
pollutants discharge control
