摘要
风险投资不同利益主体之间会形成双重委托代理关系,并因此会产生相应的委托代理风险。风险投资的高效运作,必须有效解决这种委托代理风险。本文从监督和激励机制方面,探讨了有限合伙制风险投资企业的治理机制问题。
Venture Investment between the different interest groups will form a duat agency relationship, and would have principal-agent risks. The operation of Venture capital must efficiently resolve the risk. The paper explores the problem of governance mechanism of limited partnership venture capital corporate from supervision and motivation.
出处
《科技广场》
2011年第8期161-164,共4页
Science Mosaic
基金
南昌市软科学研究科技项目(2010-RKX-009)的阶段性成果
关键词
双重委托代理
监督
激励
有限合伙制
Dual Principal-agent
Supervision
Motivation
Limited Partnership
