摘要
以"利维坦假说"为理论起点,对"以足投票"机制在中国的适用性进行了理论探讨,并利用相关数据进行实证检验。研究发现,中国人口流动对不同地区地方政府规模的影响存在区域差异效应。人口流动对不同地区地方官员晋升环境以及财政支出压力影响的差异是形成区域差异效应的重要原因所在。据此,应在加强政府审计、改革政绩考核体系等方面采取措施,对地方政府不合理扩张规模行为加以遏制。
Starting from the ＂Leviathan hypothesis＂, this paper makes a theoretical exploration in the applicability of ＂foot voting＂ theory in China, and then tests it in a panel data model. The paper finds a regional difference in the impact that China＇s population transfer has on the relating local government sizes, and the regional difference is mainly engendered by the different situation of the officials＇promotion and pressure of fiscal expenditure affect- ed by the transfer. It holds, therefore, that measures should be taken to strengthen government audit, to reform the performance assessment, so that government size expansion can be controlled.
出处
《南京人口管理干部学院学报》
CSSCI
2011年第4期58-62,共5页
Journal of Nanjing College for Population Programme Management
基金
上海市教育委员会重点学科建设基金资助项目(J50504)
关键词
人口流动
地方政府规模
区域差异
财政分权
Population Transfer
A Local Government Size
Regional Different
Fiscal Decentralization
