摘要
设计合理的激励机制能有效防范基金市场道德风险的发生。在信息不对称条件下,构建了存在老鼠仓行为的委托代理模型,通过对模型的理论分析,表明老鼠仓行为的存在会降低基金经理努力水平及其承担风险的意愿,从而损害基金投资者的利益。在此基础上,引入声誉激励机制,发现声誉激励机制能提高基金经理增加基金收益的努力水平,增加基金经理承担风险的意愿,保护基金投资者的利益。
The rationally designed incentive mechanism can prevent the moral hazard in the fund market. Under asymmetric information, this paper suggests constructing the principal-agent model in the case of the rat trading, and proposes that the rat trading could reduce the efforts and the level of risk selection of the fund manager, for which would be injurious to the fund investors＇ interests. Based on the researches above, this paper introduces the reputation incentive mechanism to the model and concludes that the reputation mechanism directly and indirectly increases the efforts and the will of avoiding risk of the fund manager, which can protect the interests of the fund investors.
出处
《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2011年第5期42-48,共7页
Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金项目"基金行业激励机制设计与中国股票市场健康发展问题研究"(08BJY152)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目资助(NCET-07-0857)
关键词
基金经理
激励机制
老鼠仓
投资行为
Fund Management
Incentive mentioned
Rat Trade
Investor Behavior
