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网络效应下的架构标准创新及其社会福利分析

Architecture Standard Innovation under Network Effect and Social Welfare Analysis
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摘要 通过对网络效应下的架构标准创新进行研究,本文发现,在位厂商通过采取开放架构标准,推动市场标准快速形成,在进入厂商新产品创新成功率不高,或新产品效率提高不是很大的情况下,迅速统一的市场标准提高了社会福利;然而,在进入厂商新产品创新成功率较高,或新产品效率提高较大的情况下,迅速统一的市场标准降低了社会福利.也就是说,开放架构标准引致迅速形成的市场标准相对于封闭架构标准而言,并不总产生正的社会福利效应,甚至会损害社会福利. On researching the architecture standard innovation under network effect, this paper finds that if the incumbent firm a- dapts the open architecture standard, the market standard will be formed quickly. The rapidly integrated market standard may decrease the social welfare when the enter firm's new product innovation is highly efficient. Market standard can increase the social welfare only on the condition that the enter firm's creation is low efficiency. In a word, compared with the closed system, the open architecture standard sys- tem is not always to the benefit of the whole society, sometimes, it may destroy the social welfare.
作者 王君美 潘慧
出处 《经济数学》 北大核心 2011年第3期33-40,共8页 Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金 山东省软科学基金资助项目(2020RKGB1123) 山东省教育厅基金资助项目(J09WH20) 烟台大学博士启动资助项目(JG11D09)
关键词 网络效应 架构标准 产品创新 过程创新 社会福利 network effect architecture standard product innovation process innovation social welfare
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参考文献9

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