摘要
本文采用2001-2006年发生的407起上市公司大宗股权协议转让数据,研究了实际控制人性质、股权性质变更和控制权转让方式对转让溢价的影响,发现政府作为目标公司实际控制人,具有与非政府实际控制人所不同的"掏空"方式;政府实际控制人将控制权转让给不具有政府背景的并购方时,更倾向于收取较高的转让溢价;在政府普遍干预控制权市场的制度背景下,异地出让控制权带有明显的地方保护主义色彩;并购方收购目标公司的溢价越高,内幕交易越严重,宣告日前的累计超额收益成为大股东攫取控制权私有收益的最终实现形式。
With the data of 407 listed companies agreement transfer for the period 2001 -2006,this paper empirically tests the impact of the actual controllers＇ feature and of the ways of stock right transfer on transfer premium. The results demonstrate that as the actual controllers of target company, the government officers have different ways of ＂ tunnelling＂ from non - government controllers. The authority actual controllers will be prone to higher transfer premium when the share is of privatization. There is strong local protectionism feature with transferring control right to other municipalities in the background that government officers usually interfer in market for corporate control. The higher the transfer premium that buyer pays, the more serious of insider trading, and the cumulative abnormal return got by controllers before declaration is the final form of private benefits.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第5期57-68,78,共13页
Economic Review
关键词
控制权私有收益
实际控制人性质
寻租
内幕交易
Private Benefits of Control
Feature of Factual Controller
Rant - seeking
Insider Trading
