期刊文献+

多物品组合采购两阶段机制设计 被引量:2

Two-stage mechanism design on multi-goods combinatorial procurement
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 设计了一种先"组合拍卖"再"议价谈判"的多物品两阶段采购机制.研究发现,不同于单物品采购,多物品采购两阶段机制中,组合拍卖阶段的获胜者应该区分为不同类别-四种获胜供应商,进一步分析了采购商对其应采取的相应价格策略.基本结论是,拍卖阶段存在最优获胜者确定方案和相应的激励相容投标策略.谈判阶段中,就采购商的议价策略而言,四种获胜供应商应被区别为"第一类供应商"和"第二类供应商",并分别给出了采购商采取谈判策略、按照拍卖价格交易,或宣布交易失败的相应条件. The paper designs a two-stage mechanism for procurement.The mechanism first implements combinatorial auction then price bargaining.Particularly,it shows that an important difference between one-unit procurement auction and heterogeneous procurement auction is that there exist four types of winning suppliers in the combinatorial stage.The result indicates that in auction stage holds optimal WDP for the procurer.The suppliers also have incentive compatible bidding strategies.In bargaining stage the four types of the winning suppliers are divided into two groups,"first class suppliers"and"second class suppliers".Finally,the paper gives corresponding conditions for procurer's price strategies,i.e.,initiating bargaining,using auction outcome and declaring trade failure.
作者 黄河
出处 《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2011年第1期74-81,共8页 Journal of Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071171 70701040) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100200) 重庆市科委自然科学基金计划资助项目(CSTC 2010BB0041)
关键词 多物品采购 组合拍卖 议价谈判 两阶段机制 heterogeneous goods procurement combinatorial auctions bargaining two-stage mechanism
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献13

  • 1侯云先,林文.新兴产业保护中的两产品关税谈判模型[J].系统工程学报,2004,19(5):470-476. 被引量:7
  • 2张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海人民出版社,1999,12.4.
  • 3Park J B, Kim B H, Kim J H, Jung M H. A continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2001, 16(4) : 847--855.
  • 4Hao Shangyou. A study of basic bidding strategy in clearing pricing auctions [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2000, 15(3) : 975---980.
  • 5Brainard S L, Toulouse I. Strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1996, (63): 81-105.
  • 6Kiminory M. Perfect equilibrium in a trade liberalization game[ J]. The American Economic Review, 1990, (June): 480-491.
  • 7Collie D R. Bilateralism is good: Trade blocs and strategic export subsides[J]. Oxford Economic Papers, 1997, 49: 504-520.
  • 8Outrata J V. Necessary optimality conditions for stackelberg problems[J]. Journal of Opti. Theory and Appl. (JOTA), 1993, 76(2): 305-320..
  • 9Bard J F, Falk J E. An explict solution to the multi-level programming problem[J]. Comput. & OR, 1982, 9(10): 77-100.
  • 10文福拴,A.K.David.电力市场中的投标策略[J].电力系统自动化,2000,24(14):1-6. 被引量:112

共引文献23

同被引文献7

引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部