摘要
有效的监管体系是发挥排污权交易制度优越性的根本前提。针对目前我国长期以来环境执法中"两高一低"的困境,本文通过构建管制者与排污企业之间的两阶段动态博弈模型,分析了排污权交易条件下企业的经营决策,包括生产、削减、违规与许可证交易等,进而从监管力度、许可证分配、违规处罚结构三方面,对有效实现总量控制目标的最优监管机制进行研究。结果表明:在严格依据总量控制目标的前提下,社会福利最大化与管制成本有效的监管机制目标一致;然而,管制者的执法收益应当得到足够警惕,在低执法收益下,社会最优的监管策略是采用边际处罚线性或递减的惩罚结构,设定足够的监管力度以激励企业守法排放;而当执法收益过分大于制裁成本时,任何追求成本有效的监管机制都会使制度流于形式。此外,在企业微观信息未知的情况下,结论依然具有指导意义。最后,结合结论对我国排污权交易监管现状进行了初步探讨。
Effective supervision is the prerequisite for enforcing emissions trading programs to exert its advantages. Addressing the persistent predicament in environmental law enforcement in China, by constructing a two-stage dynamic game of regulator and polluting firms, the optimal supervision mechanism to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively in emissions trading system is studied, including supervision level, the aggregate supply of permits and penalty shape. The results show that, the enforcing benefits should be paid more attention. When enforcement benefits are smaller, inducing full compliance with a linear or decreasing marginal penalty and setting adequate supervision level is cost-effective. However, when enforcing benefits are excessively larger than sanctioning costs, emissions trading system would become a mere formality. Finally, the results hold without any knowledge of firms＇ private information, and recommendations are made when combining the results with the status of environmental supervision in China.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期14-19,共6页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.70731002)
教育部博士点科研基金资助项目(No.20090091110001)
关键词
排污权交易系统
监管机制
惩罚结构
最优策略
emissions trading system
supervision mechanism
penalty shape
optimal strategy.
