摘要
为合理分配成员间的收益,提高供应链运作绩效,针对制造商和经销商组成的供应链,建立了收益控制权意义下的委托代理激励契约模型。在不同信息属性(对称和非对称)状态下,通过该模型,提出了委托人最优激励支付和代理人最优努力投入,并以供应链期望收益效用最大化为目标,分析了委托人和代理人收益控制权范围,提出了它们之间可以达成的最优契约模式和可拥有的最优收益控制权比率。最后论证了代理人隐藏行动下的成本节约以及由此造成委托人收益损失程度,并对该模型的适用场合进行了说明。
To distribute benefit among participants reasonably so as to improve the efficiency of supply chain,aiming at the manufacturer-dealer supply chain,a principal-agent incentive contract model viewed from benefit disposal right was established.Based on the model,the optimal incentive pay of principal and efforts of agent were obtained under symmetric and asymmetric information.Taking the expected-revenue-maximizing as object,the scope of the optimal benefit disposal right for both the principal and the agents was defined.The optimal contract mode and the ratio of their optimal benefit control rights were suggested.Cost saving of agents＇ hidden activities and its effect on principals＇ revenue were discussed.Finally,applied occasion of this model was defined.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第2期380-388,共9页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872041)
江苏省博士后科研基金资助项目(0802055C)~~
关键词
收益控制权
供应链
委托代理
激励机制
benefit disposal right
supply chains
principal-agent
incentive mechanism
