摘要
高违约率已经成为目前订单农业面临的重要问题。由于面临对方违约,另一方可能有多种选择,现有文献关于违约后签约方的行为反应从两个极端理论假设进行了推演。本文遵循Volker Beckmann和Silke Boger的思路,建立了一个分析农户和公司采取法律行动的简单静态的理论分析模型,以预测其行动取向。认为随着社会经济的发展,司法效率的提高,公司和农户的信用状况将会改善,农户和公司的生产规模也会扩大,违约行为就会减少,公司或者农户针对违约的行为选择也会做出相应改变。
High rate of breach of contract has become a serious problem facing contract farming.In face of one party＇s breach of contract,the other party has various choices.The current literature makes deduction on behavioral response of the signer after breach of contract from the two extreme theoretical hypotheses.This paper constructs a static theoretical analysis model to analyze how farmer and company resort to legal action and predict their behavior on the basis of previous research of Volker Beckmann and Silke Boger.It holds the view that with the socio-economic advancement,improvement of judicial efficiency,the credit condition of company and farmer will be enhanced,specialization of the production,processing and selling of agricultural products will be promoted,production scale of farmer and company will be enlarged,and hence breach of contract will be reduced,company and farmer will make changes on their response to breach of contract.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期99-107,共9页
Finance & Economics
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目:<中国农业产业化经营风险评估的方法与应用研究>(编号:NCET070587)阶段性成果
关键词
公司+农户
违约
静态反应
利己性关系模型
Company-Farmer
Breach of Contract
Static Response
Self Relation Model
