摘要
自1990年代初以来,德国传统的内部人主导的公司治理体系经历了重大的改革。这些改革导致了德国公司治理的"混合体系",即利用股东主导体系的要素来补充传统的利益相关者主导体系。改革使外部人对公司的控制逐步增强,内部人的控制受到牵制。然而,由于既得利益的存在和德国特有的政治传统,德国的公司治理体系仍然存在着一些难以解决的问题,包括内控机制的合理性、利益冲突问题和外控机制的有效性问题。
Since the early 1990s Germany's traditional insider-oriented corporate governance system has undergone signif- icant reforms, which lead to a "Hybrid System", complementing the traditional stakeholder system with important elements of the shareholder system. The reforms have gradually increased the control of outsiders and constrained the control of insiders to the corporations. However, due to the existence of vested interests and Germany's characteristic political traditions, there are still some difficult problems in Germany's corporate governance system, relating to the rationality of internal control mechanisms, conflict of interest issue and the effectiveness of external control mechanisms.
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
2011年第1期80-85,共6页
Industrial Economics Research