摘要
环境的不确定性使得当前战略联盟条件变得很复杂,而不完全合同理论为分析战略联盟提供了新的视角。本文在Hart的企业边界模型中加入机会主义行为因素,构建出联盟边界模型;通过博弈分析方法,进一步探讨了多种情况下机会主义行为对联盟边界变化(即联盟不完全性)的影响。
Environmental uncertainties make the conditions of strategic alliances very complicated now.Incomplete contract theory gives a new angle of view to analyze the strategic allianc-es.In the framework of incomplete contract theory,this article discusses opportunistic behavior＇s impacts in the alliance.Based on transaction cost theory,resource dependence theory and organizational learning theory,it studies the border issue of the alliance.Specifically,it uses the experience of Hart＇s enterprise boundary model（2010）,defines alliance＇s common benefits and private benefits,adds opportunistic benefits variable and builds the alliance boundary model.By game analyses,it discusses the impact of opportunistic behavior on alliance＇s boundary and alliance＇s incompleteness in many conditions.The results are：when the condition is static,the alliances＇ boundary is consistent with Hart＇s model;when the condition is dynamic and the discounts of alliance member＇s private benefits are the same,the alliances＇ boundary is consistent with Hart＇s model regardless of limited games or unlimited games;when the condition is dynamic and the discounts of alliance member＇s private benefits are different,new condition is needed to restrict the opportunistic behavior,and the alliances＇ boundary condition is stricter than Hart＇s model＇s;when the condition is dynamic and the discounts of alliance member＇s private benefits are different,the alliances＇ boundary condition on limited games is stricter than that on unlimited games.On the basis above,the article gives the relevant practical significance and management enlightenment,including：alliance is an organization between the integration（merger） and non-integration;opportunistic benefits are real,not contracted,not confirmed,and transferred;preventing opportunistic behavior is the same important as setting power distribution mechanisms;common benefits and private benefits（Hart＇s private benefits added to opportunistic benefits） together determine the boundaries of the alliance;analyses of opportunistic benefits＇ evolution need to focus on the discounts of alliance member＇s private benefits and game time,and so on.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期50-58,共9页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金(70972065)
上海市科委软科学研究博士生学位论文(201006001)资助
关键词
战略联盟
不完全合同
动态博弈
重复博弈
机会主义行为
Strategic Alliance
Incomplete Contract
Dynamic Games
Repeated Games
Opportunistic Behavior
