摘要
托马斯·库恩视科学为科学家团体从事的活动,仅仅从主体方面去理解科学发现和科学革命的逻辑和历史,科学的发展被看作完全靠信仰推动的过程,过分夸大了科学共同体的直觉和心理因素的作用,否认了经验和理性的基础作用,而走向直觉主义的科学本质观;以科学理论的可错性否定存在评价理论的客观标准,走向约定主义的标准观;撇开科学和社会之间的相互作用,对科学历史的考察仅仅从社会学、解释学上去理解,没有结合认识论的分析,致使将科学家的行为与科学家的认识混淆起来,以此否认科学理论是对现实世界的反映,否认科学是朝向真理的累积进步事业,走向了实用主义的科学进步观。
Thomas Kuhn has changed our understanding about science with his concepts of paradigm and paradigm incommensurability, leading an epistemology revolution across the Western academic circle. He is the first to introduce the social and psychological factors to the analysis of scientific understanding process, and describes a unique scientific view, different from logical positivism and critical rationalism. A pioneer as he was, his works have been criticized by many scholars since publication for the vague concept and contradiction of his theory. This article analyses the merits and limitations of his views on the philosophy of science.
出处
《山东科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2010年第6期1-7,共7页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
山东大学自主创新项目"马克思主义科学实践观研究"(IFW09156)
