摘要
在现代化的公司结构当中,所有者越来越少参与企业的日常运作和管理,经营者在某种程度上成为了企业的实际控制者,当企业重组的时候,二者目标的不一致会损害企业所有者的权益。在完全信息动态博弈的框架下,分析了企业重组当中的委托代理问题,对重组过程中对经营者进行激励和约束的问题得到了一些启发和结论。
In modern corporations, fewer stock owners participate in the operation and management works. Managers have become the actual controller of corporations somehow. When corporation restructured, the inconsistency between the goals of owners and managers will violate the owners＇ right. In this paper, we analyze the agency problem in corporation restruc- turing under dynamic game framework with complete information, and get some conclusion of the incentive and constraint problem on managers in corporation restructure.
出处
《科技管理研究》
北大核心
2011年第2期115-117,126,共4页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"工程项目交易方式及其衡量体系研究"(70772057)
关键词
激励机制
约束机制
企业重组
incentives
constraint mechanism
corporate restructuring
