摘要
在定性阐述走私商逃税危害的基础上,定量分析了形成走私商逃税的关税、海关检查打击走私的成本以及走私惩罚力度等直接经济因素,考虑了海关纳税与走私逃税是2个参与入之间的对称信息静态博弈问题及其混合纳什均衡解,讨论了关税、打击走私的成本与概率以及惩罚力度等因素对均衡解的影响,为海关打击走私和我国制定有关法规提供了参考依据。
Based on the discription about the disadvantages of smuggling, direct economicfactors, such as tariff, cost on opposing smugglers and punishment effects, etc. are stated.The game of complete information model including taxing and smuggling is built to get asolution of Nash equilibrium. The influences of the economic factors on the equilibrium areanalyzed to give some advices on the opposing to the smuggling.
出处
《中国农业大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
1999年第4期1-5,共5页
Journal of China Agricultural University
基金
国家自然科学基金