摘要
以回购契约模型为基础,研究了考虑可靠性的物流服务供应链能力协调问题,分析竞争联盟协调策略和Stackelberg主从协调策略下的物流能力订购量、回购价格和期望利润。通过算例分析,说明物流能力购买价格的变化对竞争联盟协调策略下的物流能力订购量和物流服务供应链的期望利润并无影响,只是实现了对集成商和提供商期望利润的重新分配;物流服务集成商要求功能型物流服务提供商达到的可靠度增加,竞争联盟协调策略和Stackelberg主从协调策略下最优物流能力订购量、最优回购价格、集成商的期望利润、提供商的期望利润、物流服务供应链的期望利润均减少。
The paper researches capacity coordination of logistics service supply chain considering reliability based on buy-back contracts,analyzes the logistics capacity order quantity,buy back price and expected payoff under the competition alliance strategy and Stackelberg strategy.Through analyzing examples,the paper expounds the change of logistic capacity price has no influence on the expected benefit of logistic capacity order quantity and logistic service supply chain under the competition alliance strategy,and just has realized the re-distribution for the expected benefits of integrators and suppliers;the required credibility of logistic service integrators to functional logistic service suppliers is increasing,and the optimized logistic capacity order quantity,optimized buy-back price,expected benefit of integrators and suppliers and expected benefit of logistics service supply chain are all reducing.
出处
《铁道运输与经济》
北大核心
2010年第11期52-56,共5页
Railway Transport and Economy
关键词
回购契约
物流服务供应链
物流能力
协调
Buy-back Contracts
Logistics Service Supply Chain
Logistics Capacity
Coordination
