摘要
审计意见购买直接关系到投资者利益保护机制的实现,已经成为当前各国政府关注的重大问题。文章研究发现,整体来看,相对于没有政治关系的公司,有政治关系并不能帮助公司减小获取非标审计意见的概率,但对于前一期被出具非标审计意见的公司来说,政治关系能帮助公司对现任审计师实现审计意见购买;进一步研究发现,有政治关系的公司更倾向于选择大所购买审计意见,并且大所没有收取审计费用溢价。研究结果表明,有政治关系的民营企业不必通过审计师变更,完全可以通过关系向现任(大所)审计师购买审计意见,以减少管制成本。因此独立审计充当法律的替代机制实现对投资者的保护会受到非正式制度(政治关系)的不利影响。
Opinion shopping is directly related to the investors protection mechanism,and has become a major concern of national governments.The paper finds that,compared to firms without political connection,political connection cannot help the firms obtain clean audit opinions on the whole.But for those firms which are issued with modified audit opinions at the previous period,political connection can help them make opinion shopping.Furthermore,firms with political connection prefer to purchase audit opinions from large audit firms,and the large audit firms do not charge higher audit fees.The results show that those private firms with political connection could directly purchase audit opinions from large audit firms through political connection,not the change of auditors,to decrease supervision costs.Therefore,independent audit,as an alternative mechanism to implement the law on investors protection,will be affected adversely by an informal system,namely political connection.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第11期104-114,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CJL022)
安徽工业大学青年教师科研项目
关键词
政治关系
审计意见购买
投资者保护
political connection
opinion shopping
investors protection
