摘要
论文试图就中国未能实现财政教育投入达到GDP的4%的政策目标提出一个解说:教育在中国地方官员的激励体制中占据一个很低的位置,导致它在地方财力分配决策时被边缘化。这个解说在我们对1997-2006省级面板数据分析那里得到了证明:随着地方自有财政收入和转移支付的边际递增,财政教育投入呈边际递减的趋势。
This paper attempts to explain why China has failed to reach the target of public spending in education as 4%of GDP by arguing that this is because education is marginalized in public budgeting for its marginalized position in the incentive system for Chinese local officials.This argument is supported empirically through an analysis of cross-province panel data from 1997 through 2006,which reveals that along with marginal increases of local revenues and fiscal transfers,the proportion of funds allocated to education in local budget was in a tendency of decreasing.
出处
《公共行政评论》
2010年第4期68-84,共17页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
国家社科基金项目《地方政府公共支出偏好研究--财政转移支付的视角》(编号:09CZZ030)
2009年中国发展研究青年奖学金资助项目
关键词
财政教育投入
地方官员
公共预算
激励机制
Public Spending in Education
Local Officials
Public Budgeting
Incentive System
