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公交与轨道交通的多维Stac kelberg博弈与均衡 被引量:3

Multidimensional Stackelberg game model of bus and rail transport
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摘要 指出公交和轨道交通的均衡发展是多维Stackelberg博弈过程,给出多维Stackelberg博弈和多维Nash均衡的定义,分析公交和轨道交通的博弈效用函数,以及其博弈的阶段性均衡解.实例分析表明:公交和轨道交通的均衡发展是以轨道交通为先导,公交尾随,城市居民参与,交管部门密切配合管理的追求系统最优的多维Stackelberg博弈过程,按照多维Nash均衡解来选择策略向量,公交和轨道交通的服务能获得阶段性全局最优.此研究有利于提高城市公交和轨道交通的服务水平. In this paper,we point out that the bus and rail transportation is the balanced development of multi-dimensional process Stackelberg game.The concepts of the multidimensional Stackelberg game and the multidimensional Nash equilibrium are introduced,and the analysis of the game utility function are given,and its phase equilibrium solutions are proposed.Case analysis shows that: The bus and rail transport have the balanced development of the rail transport leader,the bus follower,urban inhabitant participation,closely with the management of the traffic control department in pursuit with the multidimensional optimal Stackelberg game process.In accordance with the multi-dimensional strategy Nash equilibrium solution to select the decision vectors,bus and rail services will be phased global optimum.This study will help improve urban public transport and rail transport services.
出处 《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2010年第5期637-641,共5页 Journal of Systems Engineering
基金 中国教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060286005) 中国博士后基金资助项目(20070411018)
关键词 公共交通 轨道交通 多维博弈 STACKELBERG博弈 NASH均衡 public transport rail transport multidimensional game Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium
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参考文献7

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共引文献61

同被引文献23

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