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无线多跳网络中节点效用的博弈机制研究 被引量:1

Nodes Utility in Wireless Multi-hop Networks:a Game Theoretic Analysis
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摘要 无线多跳网络中的节点通常都具有自主性和资源受限的特点,因此开展效用研究具有重要意义.论文提出将声誉机制与价格机制相结合,并应用博弈理论促使发送端同时兼顾所预付的通信价格与转发节点的可信度.根据博弈理论对无线多跳网络中节点行为进行了建模分析.最后,本文给出纳什均衡的存在条件,并且通过仿真实验证实了以誉价比机制作为发送端决策因素的合理性. In multi-hop wireless networks, all nodes usually have the characteristics of autonomy and limited resources. The study on utility of the nodes is therefore significant. This paper presents an algorithm combining with the reputation and pricing mechanisms. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm ensures the senders to take into account both prepaid price of communications and credit of forwarding nodes based on game theory. The analytical modeling of nodes behavior is also proposed according to game theory. Finally, this paper concludes the existence of Nash Equilibrium. Through simulation, the rationality of the ratio of credit to price being decision-making factors for senders is demonstrated as well.
作者 陈心瑜 许力
出处 《小型微型计算机系统》 CSCD 北大核心 2010年第10期2038-2042,共5页 Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(61072080)资助 福建省自然科学基金项目(2008J0014)资助
关键词 博弈论 纳什均衡 声誉 价格 game theory nash equilibrium reputation price
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参考文献10

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