摘要
传统的委托代理模型存在激励的短期性与道德风险的单边性两方面的问题.通过引入解聘补偿机制,建立并分析了信息完全对称和不完全对称两种情况下的股权激励模型,研究了委托人解聘倾向对股权激励合同设计的影响机制.研究结果表明:在初始合同中引入解聘补偿,不仅可以有效缓解委托人的道德风险,而且可以进一步提升代理人的工作努力程度.
The traditional principal-agent model has two disadvantages with one being the short-term incentive, and the other the unilateralism of the moral hazard. This paper established a stock option incentive model based on the dismissal compensation, studied the optimal design of the incentive contract under symmetrical and asymmetrical information conditions, and analyzed the effect of the dismissal tendency on the design of the incentive contract. The findings suggest that the introduction of the dismissal compensation into the initial contract not only relieves the principal＇s moral hazard, but also further improves the agent＇s working efforts.
出处
《经济数学》
北大核心
2010年第3期9-15,共7页
Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971078)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般规划资助项目(09YJA630089)
山东省自然科学基金重点资助项目(Z2007H04)
山东省软科学资助项目(2009RKB152)
关键词
解聘补偿
解聘倾向
股权激励
委托代理模型
dismissal compensation
dismissal tendency
stock option incentive
principal-agent model
