摘要
"理性人"和公共知识是博弈论中的两个公设,即假设博弈局中人都是理性的,在公共知识的背景下选取行为策略,使自己的效用达到最大化。然而,正是从这样的假设前提出发,却使博弈理性推理陷入困境,"理性人"不理性。因此,符合逻辑的是对博弈论公设产生质疑。
＂Rational agent＂ and common knowledge are two public pre-assumptions in game theory, which assume that players in game are rational, and choose action strategy against a background of common knowledge to maximize utility. However, it consequentially puts rational reasoning in a dilemma, and ＂rational agent＂ is reasonless. Logically, what we can do is to throw doubt on public pre-assumptions in game theory.
出处
《天津商业大学学报》
2010年第5期37-39,共3页
Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce
基金
国家社会科学基金"经济逻辑研究"(06BZX050)
关键词
理性
公共知识
集体理性
个体理性
rationality
common knowledge
collective rationality
individual rationality
