摘要
本文从高管股票期权(ESO)激励与股东利益相关性、实施ESO激励的动因以及授予ESO后的公司风险承担和对R&D的投资行为三个方面进行了回顾和梳理了国外有关文献,发现授予ESO对公司高管会形成正负两种激励,故ESO既可能增加公司价值,也可能增加新的代理问题、损害股东利益。因为公司实施ESO激励有诸如公司规模、资本结构、管理者的视野与任期、所有权结构和流动性约束等内在动因和增长机会、面临的风险和会计数据噪声等外部促进因素,而各因素会形成高管不同动机的驱动力,进而在风险承担和R&D投资上采用不同的行为。我国上市公司ESO激励的效果、动因与行为还有待更深入地研究,国外的研究成果对促进我国上市公司实施ESO激励提供了很好的借鉴。
As an effective mechanism of governance, ESO incentive combines executive compensation and perform- ance very well, which is wildly introduced in listed company in the world. This paper reviews and clears up some relevant foreign literatures in following three aspects： relationship between ESO incentive and firm Value, motivators to implement ESO, risks taking and the investment on R＆D after executives are granted to ESO. After studying above three aspects, we found ESO may make positive and negative incentive for executives. That is, ESO can raise the value of company ; mean- while, it may create new agency problems to harm firm value. ESO incentive is implemented for internal and external cau- ses. Internal causes are such as company size, capital structure, managers＇ view and tenure, ownership structure, liquidi- ty constraints and so on. External causes are growth opportunity, risk, accountin~ noise and etc. Different causes may promote executives different actions, and then different actions on the risk taking and R＆D investment are adopted. The effects, motivators and behaviors of ESO incentive of listed companies in our country needs to be studied deeply. These literatures from foreign countries are helpful and provide good reference for our listed companies＇ implementation of ESO incentive.
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期34-42,共9页
Research on Economics and Management
