溢出率、减排研发合作行为和最优补贴政策被引量：27

Optimal subsidies for different abatement R&D organizations in duopoly with emissions tax

导出

摘要通过建立一个关于政府和双寡头的三阶段研发-补贴博弈模型,在征收排放税的条件下,分别对合作和不合作减排研发的政府研发补贴政策进行研究。研究发现:(1)在补贴条件下,合作研发情形下的社会福利比不合作情形下要高;产业的溢出率较小时,企业进行研发合作会比不合作获得更多利润,而在产业的溢出率较大时,则刚好相反;(2)在补贴条件下,当产业的溢出率较小时,企业选择合作研发行为;当溢出率较大时,企业选择不合作研发行为。针对不同的减排研发合作行为有不同的补贴政策。 by the three-stage game model for the industry of duopoly with emission tax that is exogenous,we examine how the government makes optimal subsidy policy in consideration of duopoly＇ cooperative forms of abatement RD.we find：（1） with subsidization,social welfare in RD cooperation is always higher than that in non-cooperation;if the spillover of duopoly is less the profit in cooperation is higher than that in non-cooperation,if the spillover is larger the profit in cooperation is less;（2） with subsidization,if the spillover between duopoly is less the duopoly prefer to choose RD cooperation,if the spillover is larger the duopoly prefer to choose RD non-cooperation.Different optimal subsidy policies shall be applied for cooperative RD behaviors in different forms.

作者孟卫军

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《科学学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第8期1160-1164,共5页 Studies in Science of Science

关键词环境研发合作环境研发补贴排放税溢出 environmental research joint venture environmental R＆D subsidies emissions tax spillover

分类号 F062.9 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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