摘要
为探索解决"公司+农户"模式违约问题的优化模式和对策,通过静态博弈模型揭示了"公司+农户"模式违约问题的根本原因是市场风险的存在,并得出了稳定的"公司+农户"模式的价格波动区间;契约稳定性模型揭示了"利益共享"的分配机制、"公司+农户"经营模式交易费用的降低、约束机制的加强和信誉机制的建立都有利于"公司+农户"经营模式的稳定和发展。引入期货、期货期权对"公司+农户"模式进行优化,通过博弈模型分析得出:"公司+农户+期货"优化模式能解决公司的违约问题,但没能解决农户的机会主义行为和违约问题;"公司+农户+期货期权"优化模式从根本上扼制了农户的违约行为,规避了公司远期合约的市场风险,稳定了公司未来的得益和农产品货源,也解决了公司的风险和违约问题。
In order to explore optimization mode and countermeasures for solving breaking contract problem of ＂Company Farmer＂,the established static game model reveals that the basic reason of the breaking contract problem of ＂Company Farmer＂ is market risk,and the price fluctuation interval of static ＂Company Farmer＂ is obtained.The established contract stability model reveales that the distribution mechanism of ＂benefit sharing＂,the reduction of the transaction cost of ＂Company Farmer＂,the strengthening restraint mechanism and the establishment of reputation mechanism are all helpful for stability and development of ＂Company Farmer＂.Simultaneously,futures and options are introduced to optimize ＂Company Farmer＂,and the ＂Company Farmer futures＂ optimization mode can solve breaking contract risk of company,but not solve breaking contract risk of farmer;and the ＂Company Farmer options＂ optimization mode restrains breaking contract behavior of farmer radically,which can avoid risk of company,lock the company＇s future profit,and stabilize the source of goods of agricultural product,and also solves the problem of the risk and contract breaking behavior of company.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期148-157,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
江西省科技厅软科学基金项目
江西省教育厅项目
