摘要
本文从产品纵向差异的角度出发,研究了垄断厂商为构建进入壁垒在选择产品质量方面所采取的策略性行为。通过采用一个扩展式博弈,分析了在位者和潜在进入者的质量选择行为所形成的各种产品质量组合及其支付。研究发现,在位者可以通过一部分研发投资,抢先承诺提供多档次质量的产品,填补消费者的需求空间,减少潜在进入者的期望收益,使其做出不进入的决定。所以,在位者在产品质量方面的策略性行为就构成了进入壁垒。
Based on vertical product differentiations, by choosing various product qualities, monopolistic firms build entry barriers. Using an extension - type game,by combining a variety of product qualities and payments of the incumbent and potential entrants this paper addresses the quality - choice behaviors. This paper concludes that the incumbent makes R ＆ D investment and launches multigrade commitment to provide products with certain quality to meet consumers＇ demands and lower income expectation from potential entrants. In this way, potential entrants are kept from these industries. Therefore, the barrier strategies in product qualities to stop from the incumbents are established and characterized.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期13-18,共6页
Economic Review
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(项目批准号为NCET-07-0375)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目批准号为09YJA790086)
暨南大学创新基金资助
关键词
进入壁垒
策略性行为
纵向差异
质量承诺
Barriers to Entry
Strategic Behaviors
Vertical Differences
Commitment
