摘要
高管薪酬与公司经营业绩密不可分,依据委托代理理论提出高管薪酬与公司经营业绩关系的六种假设,经过实证分析得到相应的结论。
The senior managers＇ compensation incentive cannot be separated with business performance. According to principal -agent theory, the paper offers six assumptions about the relationship between them and draws the conclusion through analysis.
出处
《天津市财贸管理干部学院学报》
2010年第2期5-8,共4页
Journal of Tianjin Institute of Financial and Commercial Management
关键词
高管薪酬
高管持股比例
业绩薪酬敏感性
executive pay
proportion of shareholding
the sensibility of performance -based compensation
