摘要
维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中的自我理论涉及唯我论、形而上学主体和实体自我或经验自我诸论题。维氏之目的是为可说者和不可说者划界。语言和世界逻辑同构,语言是我的语言,我的语言的界限就是世界的界限,所以自我就是世界界限。维氏之唯我论并不彻底,因为世界之外尚有不可言说者。作为世界界限之自我乃是形而上学主体,它并非世界内之事实,并非世界内之实体,不能为语言所捕捉。单纯的实体自我或经验自我本指世界内之事实,而维特根斯坦在书中实际上否定了它的存在。
Wittgenstein＇ s theory of self in Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus covers subjects of solipsism, metaphysical subject, and substantial self.Wittgenstein attempts to make a demarcation between the sayable and the unsayable. He holds that language is my language, and that the limit of my language is the limit of the world. SO the self is the limit of the world. This is the viewpoint called solipsism. But Wittgenstein＇s solipsism is not thorough and very different from that of others appeared in history before him. The self as the limit of the world is transcendental or metaphysical subject which cannot be talked about directly by language. Substantial or empirical self is a being within the world by its traditional meaning and Wittgenstein denies its existence.
出处
《兰州学刊》
CSSCI
2010年第5期1-5,共5页
关键词
自我
唯我论
形而上学主体
实体自我
语言
世界
self
solipsism
transcendental self
substantial subject
language
world
