期刊文献+

基于不完全契约的专用性人力资本投资激励 被引量:5

On the Investment Incentives of Specific Human Capital Based on Incomplete Contract
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 不完全契约理论是分析和解决专用性投资不足的有力工具。在阐述不完全契约分析框架之后,分别从个人和企业层面探讨了专用性人力资本投资的不足,最后,基于不完全契约理论探讨了专用性人力资本投资的激励措施。 The incomplete contract theory is specificity. Firstly, the analytical framework of a powerful tool for the incomplete contract under-investment of specific human capital are Lastly, incentive measures of specific human capital discussed from the analyzing theory is individual and solving under-investment of presented. Then the problems of and business views investment are studied based on incomplete contract respectively theory.
作者 马金平
出处 《科技进步与对策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第10期149-151,共3页 Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金 教育部人文社科研究项目(08JC630062) 湖北省教育厅人文社科研究项目(2008q115)
关键词 不完全契约 专用性 人力资本 投资激励 Incomplete Contract Specificity Human Capital Investment Incentives
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

  • 1盛洪,陈郁.论生产的制度结构[M].上海:上海三联书店,1994:1-24.
  • 2HART OLIVER. Firms, contracts and financial structure [M ] . Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • 3WILLIAMSON,O. The economic institute of capitalism [ M ] . New York: Free Press, 1985.
  • 4TIROLE JEAN. Procurement and renegotiation [J ] . Journal of Political Economy, 1986 (94) : 235-259.
  • 5GROSSMAN,S.,OLIVER HART. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration [ J ] . Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94 : 691-719.
  • 6HART OLIVER,JOHN MOORE. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation [ J ] . Econometrica, 1988,56: 755-786.
  • 7MILGROM, P., ROBERTS, J. Economics, Organization, and Management[ M ]. Prentice-Hall ,Upper Saddle River,N J, 1992.
  • 8埃瑞克·G·菲吕博顿 等.新制度经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998..
  • 9BAKER,GEORGE ,ROBERT GIBBONS ,KEVIN J. MURPHY. Bringing the market inside the firm? [ J ] . American Economic Review,2001,91(2):212-218.
  • 10RAJAN, RAGHURAM G.AND LUIGI ZINGALES. Power in a theory of the firm [ J ] . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, 2 : 387-432.

共引文献27

同被引文献36

  • 1王晓州.建设项目委托代理关系的经济学分析及激励与约束机制设计[J].中国软科学,2004(6):77-82. 被引量:58
  • 2李杰.知识资本与长期激励[J].北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(3):31-34. 被引量:1
  • 3周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996,31(6):71-79. 被引量:2183
  • 4周新军,段联合.知识员工“套牢”效应及其管理[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007,60(4):498-502. 被引量:1
  • 5Gert Wijnen,Rudy Kor 著,戚安邦等译独特性任务的项目与项目群管理方法[M].天津:南开大学出版社,2005.
  • 6Klein B, Crawford R G, Alchian A A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978,21 (2) : 297 - 326.
  • 7Williamson O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting [ C ]//The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1985 : 15 - 38.
  • 8Grossman S J, Hart O D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94 ( 4 ) : 690 - 719.
  • 9Becker G S. Investment in Human Capital : A Theoretical Analysis[ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1962,70 ( 5 ) : 9 -49.
  • 10Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problem: A Dynamic Perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (226) : 169 - 182.

引证文献5

二级引证文献5

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部