摘要
We quantize the Hawk-Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies （ESS）. An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk-Dove game.
We quantize the Hawk-Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies （ESS）. An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk-Dove game.
