摘要
以1999—2005年全国120多万家规模以上工业企业为样本,以政府补贴作为衡量政府与企业政治联系的变量所进行的研究结果表明:获得政府补贴企业的人均工资水平显著高于未获得政府补贴企业;补贴导致的工资差异并非直接来自补贴收入本身,而是由"是否获得补贴"这一性质所决定;这种关系几乎在所有类型企业中存在,而且各种性质的补贴都能够产生这种现象。经验研究的结果也显示,随着时间的推移,市场力量的发展可以显著地抑制政治联系的影响力。通过分析影响工资水平的因素,可以反映出我国经济发展过程中影响企业行为的政治力量和市场力量的相互关系和力量对比的变化情况。
This paper uses subsidy to measure political connection between firm and government, and tries to investigate how firm political connection affect wage inequality of between firm based on more than 1 200 thousand firm data from 1999 to 2005. Empirical results show that wage of per worker in subsidy firm is higher than wage of per worker in non-subsidy firm. The wage inequality from subsidy is determined by the quality of subsidy firm rather than the quantity of subsidy. The wage inequality from subsidy does not vary with ownership of firm and type of subsidy. In particular, market power could limit political connection effect on wage inequality. By analyzing the factor which determine the wage of per worker, this paper reflect political and market power in firm behavior and will deepen our understanding to China＇s model.
出处
《中国人民大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期69-77,共9页
Journal of Renmin University of China
基金
全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项课题
教育部新世纪人才计划
关键词
政府补贴
人均工资
政治联系
subsidy
wage inequality
political connection
