摘要
作为一种快速发展的衍生融资工具,可转债发行动机和条款设计受到理论和实践的普遍关注。从代理问题的视角,文章对歌华有线公司发行可转债主要条款,包括利率条款、转股条款及触发条款进行比较分析,发现"歌华转债"股性较强,条款设计倾向于变相发行股票,而不是降低代理成本。这一发现与经典融资理论矛盾。论文从逃避市场规则和证券发行制度缺陷两方面进行了解释。研究对公司设计转债条款和有关部门制定政策具有借鉴意义。
As a kind of fast - developing financial derivatives, the motivation of issuing and design of provisions of the convertible bond have received common concern in the theory and practice. From the perspective of the agency problem, this paper compares the main provisions of Gehua convertible bonds, including the provision of interest rate, convertible price, and the provisions of trigger, by which it found that stock property of Gehua convertible are higher than debt property. The purpose of provision design lies in disguising for issuing shares and the Gehua company did not make use of the provision design to achieve the purpose of reducing agency costs. This finding con- flicts with the classical financial theory. We try to explain that it is to avoid the issuance rules of securities market and there are deficien- cies in the system of securities issuance. Conclusion of the paper is an important reference for the business practices and relevant policy - making.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2010年第3期133-138,共6页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点课题"新企业创业机理与成长模式研究"(70732004)
国家软科学研究计划(2008GXS5D106)
南开大学"985工程"专项
关键词
歌华转债
触发条款
代理成本
gehua convertible
convertible provisions
agency costs
