摘要
在一种不拒绝内涵的意义理论中,内涵和本质属性应该如何得到充分而又完整的刻画呢?本文分析了弗雷格的含义-指称理论和卡尔纳普的内涵-外延理论对这个问题的回答,并指出在现今逐渐成为主流的蒙太古内涵语义,作为卡尔纳普意义理论的一个变种,并不能让内涵和本质属性得到充分而又完整的刻画。
In a kind of meaning theory that does not dodge from intensions, how to fully describe intensions and essential attributions within the meaning theory？ This paper analyzes the answers for this issue from the perspective of Frege＇s sense - reference theory and Carnap＇s intension - extension theory, and then shows that a generally accepted intensional theory, that is, Montague＇s theory on intensionality, a variation of Carnap＇s theory, does not offer a fully description of intensions and essential attributions.
出处
《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期30-35,共6页
Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
基金
湖南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(09YBA064)
关键词
内涵
本质属性
内涵语义
模态语义
intensions
essential attributions
intensional semantics
modal semantics
