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电磁分析环境下密码设备面向实际的安全性度量 被引量:1

Practice-oriented Security Metric for Cryptographic Device under Electromagnetic Analysis
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摘要 为在充斥电磁分析旁路攻击敌手的危险环境下评估密码设备的安全性,通过将密码学标准黑盒模型中的敌手能力进行加强,在物理可观测密码术模型的框架内,定义了具有电磁泄漏信息分析能力的密钥恢复敌手与不可分辨性判定敌手。分别以敌手成功率定量度量与敌手优势定性度量,给出密码设备面向实际的安全性度量方式。通过成功率度量方式的实验,比较了几种不同电磁旁路分辨器的攻击能力,以便为进一步研究并开发可证明抵抗电磁分析攻击的密码系统和设备打下基础。 For evaluating the security of cryptographic device in the risk environment full of electromagnetic analysis (EMA) adversaries,by enhancing the adversary's ability in the classical cryptographic black box model, two novel adversaries,the key recover adversary and the indistinguishability determined adversary who takes the advantage of electromagnetic emissions,were defined within the framework of physical observable cryptography model. For the former,the security is evaluated in quantity with the adversary's success ratio, and for the latter, the security is evaluated in quality with the adversary's advantage. With the metric of adversary's success ratio, the attack abilities of several EMA distinguishers were compared. These two practiccoricnted security metrics laid the foundations of further researching and developing EMA resistant cryptographic system and device.
出处 《计算机科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2010年第3期61-63,72,共4页 Computer Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(60571037) 国家高技术研究发展计划(863)项目(2007AA01Z454)资助
关键词 电磁分析 密码设备 面向实际 安全性度量 Electromagnetic analysis, Cryptographic device, Practice-oriented, Security metric
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参考文献14

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