摘要
本文重点讨论了《劳动合同法》的颁布对于进城务工人员收入的影响,我们用博弈论模型证明了签订劳动合同可以提高务工人员的收入,并且在一定条件下企业也可以通过生产率的上升而获利,实现“双赢”。从统计上看,签订合同的工人月收入高出347.19元,小时收入高出2.16元,OLS回归结果也发现合同对于收入有显著的正影响。但同时我们注意到有合同的劳动者本身有着更好的素质,Probit和Logit模型都验证了这一点,基于这种可能的内生性偏误,我们使用了“处置效应”来控制这一问题,并发现签订合同依旧显著提高了收入,估计月收入提高14.0%~14.9%,小时收入提高18.2%-21.5%。
This paper studies the effect of the Labor Contract Law on the income of migrants. We use a game theoretical model to show that labor contracts can increase migrants' income, and under certain conditions enterprises can also benefit from the improvement of productivity, causing a "win-win" situation. Statistics show that workers who have labor contracts earn 347.19 yuan per month or 2.16 yuan per hour more than those without con- tracts. But we notice that workers with contracts also have higher qualities. We use the method dealing with treatment effects to deal with the problem, and find labor contracts still increase migrants' income by 14.0%-14.9% for their monthly income and 18.2%-21.5% for their hourly income.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
2010年第1期687-712,共26页
China Economic Quarterly
关键词
劳动合同
博弈论
处置效应
Labor Contracts, Game Theory, Treatment Effect