摘要
在已有的经济学文献中,国家产业政策是作为市场竞争的替代手段被广泛讨论的。本文进一步引入国家特征与社会结构两个概念,分析了转型国家产业政策效率的决定机制。一个在意识形态、地缘政治影响上有着鲜明特征的转型国家,在确立产业发展模式、甚至是国家发展道路时,通过政府投资和政府主导来实现追赶目标具有现实合理性;但同时亦有可能使国家被迫承受产业政策带来的诸如抑制市场竞争、政府被利益集团俘获等负效应,本文将之概括为"转型过程中的国家产业政策悖论"。本文的分析表明,在拥有一个"强大的、致力于国家现代化"的(相对集权)政府的前提下,"产业政策效率最大化"与"维持社会结构不变"两个目标不可能同时实现。只有通过坚定不移的推进社会主义市场经济体制的建设,才能保证中国政府的产业政策实践具有"帕累托改进"的性质。
Industrial policy is widely discussed as substitution of market competition in the literature. With the two concepts of national characteristics and social structure,this paper analyses the determinants of industrial policy efficiency in transitional countries with distinct ideology and geopolitics where realistic rationality to realize catch-up goal through government investment and dominance in terms of establishing industrial development or even national development patterns. However,industrial policy may bring about undesired effects as market competition suppression and government's involvement in interest groups. This is so termed as 'industrial policy paradox in the transition' in the paper. The analysis shows that,under the premise of a (relative centralized) government which is 'formidable and devoting to the national modernization' ,goals of 'maximization of industrial policy efficiency' and 'maintaining social structure constant' cannot be simultaneously realized. The 'Pareto improvement' of China industrial policy can only be assured through firm construction of socialist market economic system.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期1-8,共8页
Modern Economic Science
基金
西安交通大学"211"三期建设项目"以战略产业发展研究为导向的产业经济学国家重点学科建设"
陕西省"十一.五"哲学社会科学基金项目(立项号:09E007)的阶段性成果
关键词
产业政策
经济转型
国家干预
社会结构
Industrial policy
Economic transition
State Intervention
Efficienc
