摘要
选取在美国上市的中国公司为样本,以其在萨班斯法案执行前后的年报为研究对象,采用截面修正琼斯模型,多元回归模型和T检验的方法验证萨班斯法案的实施是否能够有效抑制盈余管理行为。从实证结果来看,萨班斯法案的实施会使公司的可操纵应计利润减少,因而能够在一定程度上缩小上市公司盈余管理的空间。
The change in managerial discretion over financial reporting following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is investigated. Those Chinese eompanies listed in US, and do the empirical analysis by the Modified Cross Selectional Jones Model, Multiple Faetor Regressions and T-Test are selected. It is found that firms report lower discretionary accruals after Sarbanes-Oxley Act than in the period preceding Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
出处
《科学技术与工程》
2009年第24期7424-7429,共6页
Science Technology and Engineering
