摘要
在经理人努力水平和项目经营成本两种信息不对称的情况下,研究实物期权投资经理人的最优激励机制,综合应用实物期权理论和委托代理理论,在非对称信息为连续分布(区间上的均匀分布)的情况下建立了最优激励机制模型,并具体分析求解最优分成制合约,分析信息不对称对企业拥有者制定经理人最优激励合同的影响。
Studied agent＇s optimal incentive mechanism in real option investiment under the assumption that two asymmetric parameters are the manager＇s effort level and investiment running cost. By combining principle-agent theory with real option theory synthetically, optimal incentive mechanism model is established under the assumption that two asymmetric parameters＇ distribution function is Consecutive Distribution.A model is established to get the optimal sharecropping contract and the influence by information asymmetry in making agent＇s optimal incentive contract is analyzed.
出处
《科技创业月刊》
2009年第11期107-109,共3页
Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology
关键词
实物期权
委托代理
激励机制
信息不对称
连续分布
real option, agency problem, incentive mechanism, information asymmetry, conse-cutive distribution
