摘要
以锦标赛模型为基准,分析地方政府激励与土地要素利用之间的关系发现,锦标赛机制激发了地方政府在地方经济发展中的极大努力和对土地要素的最优使用;当预算约束被软化后,存在大量投入土地要素来换取高额奖励的现象,在土地要素存在多种使用途径情况下,锦标赛产生了地方政府之间的"攀比"现象,即地方政府均会将土地要素更多地投入到"投资少、见效快"的用途上去。
With the Rank-Order Tournaments model as the benchmark, and discusses the relationship between incentives of local governments and land inputs,we found that both local governments,efforts devotion to economic development and the using of land resource at their disposal are optimally motivated. With a soft budget, more input of land for larger prize is inevitable. Otherwise, when there are various economic uses of land, local governments would try to＂keep up with the Joneses＂, and projects which have ＂less costs and quick returns＂ will＂ be chosen necessarily.
出处
《湖北经济学院学报》
2009年第5期72-76,98,共6页
Journal of Hubei University of Economics
关键词
锦标赛机制
地方政府激励
土地要素
Rank-Order Tournaments
incentives of local government
land resources
