摘要
结合工程实际,通过博弈分析认为,由于项目业主有自己的代理人履行管理职能,且代理人的权力远远大于监理人,因而主动与施工单位合谋寻租的非监理人而是业主代理人;由于2002年版质量验收规范为质量管理的现实操作提供了巨大的弹性空间,同时监理人的经济利益受制于业主代理人,最终监理人的被动合谋使得业主、监理、施工三方代理人的有限度违规成为博弈均衡点。因而工程事故频发的根本原因并非监理人与承包商的合谋寻租,而现有针对监理的惩戒性制度和严格繁琐的签字手续也存在方向性错误。
In this paper, after analyzing the project principal-agent model amended to the assumed one based on game theory in light of reality, the author considered that the people conspiring with the contractors actively while they performance rent-seeking are not supervisors but the owner＇s agents,since all the project owners have their own representatives to fulfill management functions and their agents have far greater power than supervisors. In reality, as a result of one＇s economic interests dominated by the owner＇s agents, the supervisors implement a passive collusion strategy, which develops limited illegal operation of the three agents to a game equilibrium eventually because of great flexibility of the quality norms published in 2002. Thus, the root cause of accidents in project field is not the consequence of supervisors＇ active collusion but the moral risk of owner＇s agent. Therefore, the developing disciplinary supervision rules are completely wrong and will never solve the problems efficiently.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第21期31-35,共5页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
关键词
业主代理人
寻租
工程监理
被动合谋
有限度违规
博弈均衡点
Owner＇s Agents
Rent -Seeking
Engineering Supervision
Passive Collusion
Limited Illegal Operation
Game Equilibrium
