摘要
政府投资是国家干预经济和直接进行经济活动的重要手段之一,目前我国政府投资项目正大力推行代建制。任何制度的推行都会消耗一定的社会成本,代建制下政府投资项目的监管也不例外。针对目前对代建制监管效率认识不够、理论分析薄弱等问题,运用效率成本模型进行影响监管成本的因素研究,提出了提高监管效率的措施,以期在实现建设目标的前提下,合理地降低监管成本,提高社会福利。从分析代建制监管成本的概念入手,用图形分析法定性分析了监管成本与收益的关系,在此基础上运用效率成本模型研究了规制机构与代建企业的收益成本关系,揭示出监管追求的是监管收益与监管成本的最优均衡状态,物质激励和监督成本之间存在替代关系等结论。并通过分析得知,行业协会作为新监管主体的介入,能直接减少监管成本和帮助推行对代建企业激励制度,实现监管收益与监管成本的最优。
There exist problems, such as insufficient awareness and weak theoretical analysis, for agent construction in government investment projects. In light of these problems, the factors that influence the supervising cost is analyzed through cost-efficiency modeling and suggestions are provided on how to improve supervising efficiency in order to reasonably reduce supervising costs and improve social welfare. Starting from analyzing the concept of cost control under agent system, the relationship between costs and benefits is analyzed qualitatively by using graph-analysis. The relationship between regulatory agencies and construction enterprises is then determined by using the cost-efficiency model. The pursuit of supervision is an optimal balance state between supervising revenue and cost, and there exists an alternative relationship between material incentives and supervising costs. Trade association, as a new supervising body, can directly reduce supervising costs and help put the incentive system into practice.
出处
《土木工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第10期111-115,共5页
China Civil Engineering Journal
基金
铁道部科技司重大课题(2008E019)
关键词
政府投资项目
代建制
监管成本
效率成本模型
government investment projects
agent construction system
supervising cost
cost-efficient model
