摘要
以2000-2007年沪深两市6264家上市公司为研究样本,以资产周转率作为代理成本的度量指标,采用最小二乘和面板数据两种计量方法,对公司治理要素与代理成本之间的关系进行实证检验。结果显示,在9个公司治理要素中,第一大股东持股比例、管理层薪酬和管理层持股比例与代理成本显著负相关;持股董事比例与代理成本显著正相关,且持股董事比例可能存在区间效应;而前五大股东持股比例、董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事持股比例和监事会规模与代理成本无显著相关性,不能有效影响代理成本。
The paper, selecting Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets 6264 listed companies from 2000 to 2007 as samples, studies the relation between corporate governance elements and agency cost, which is measured by asset turnover rate, using the ordinary least squares and panel data two econometrics methods. Results show that, among the nine elements of corporate governance, the proportion of the largest shareholder, management remuneration and management ownership has a significant negative correlation to agency cost ; the shareholding proportion of directors is significantly positively correlative to agency costs, and there may be range effects of the proportion ; the proportion of top five shareholders, the board size, the proportion of independent directors, the shareholding ratio of directors and supervision board size has no significant correlation to agency cost.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期123-127,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(7053200170502024)
天津市哲学社会科学规划项目(TJGL08-077)
南开大学人文社会科学校内青年项目(NKQ07001)
关键词
公司治理
治理要素
委托代理
代理成本
corporate governance
governance elements
principle agency
agency cost
