摘要
提出了政府制定公共项目管制价格应以受管制企业的成本及服务质量为依据,设计了社会福利最大并满足私人企业参与约束和相容约束的激励机制模型,以诱导私人公司显示成本与质量的真实信息.利用模型得出在价格规制下收费标准会降低,需求增加,消费者剩余增大.尽管价格规制下服务质量会有所下降,为了提高社会福利,政府应选择价格管制.当私人公司自主定价时可以获得较高的收费价格,只有当需求的价格弹性较小时私人公司的利润才高于政府管制时的利润.因而,公私双方谁有合法的权力来决定价格对项目的社会福利和服务质量有重要影响.文章通过实例验证了不同信息和管制条件下价格、服务质量、消费者剩余及私人公司利润等方面的变化.
Government constitutes public project controlled price according as the cost and service quality of controlled enterprise. In order to constitute controlled price, a prompting mechanism model which realizes the maximum of social welfare and satisfies to private enterprise participating in restriction and consistent restriction is built, and induces private enterprise to show the true information of cost and quality. In the case of controlled price, charge standard will decrease, demand and consumer surplus will increase. In spite of the decrease in service quality, government chooses price control because it will advance social welfare. Private enterprise fixing a price with freedom could obtain higher charge price, but private enterprise＇s profits is higher than government controlled profit only when demand flexibility price is lower. Thus, both public and private have legal right to determine price＇s importance influence to social welfare and service quality. Some conclusions on price, service quality, consumer surplus and private enterprise＇s profits in different information and controlled condition are analyzed and verified.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第9期47-57,共11页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
重庆市哲学社会科学规划重点项目(2006-JJ02)
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ090420)
关键词
服务质量
价格规制
非对称信息
激励机制
社会福利
service quality
price regulation
asymmetric information
incentive mechanism
social welfare
