摘要
现有的研究较多地关注经济增长方面地方政府组织的协调和激励,较少注意政府组织的多任务性质产生的激励问题。本文基于多任务道德风险模型,分析了中央部委与地方政府权责分配问题。研究发现,若地方政府承担的各项职能存在较大冲突,应该分离其中的职能由中央政府垂直管理;反之,则可以由地方政府承担多项职能。政府机构改革不能仅停留在理清事权、精简机构的层面,要根据各种职能之间的关系来进行权责分配。
The existing literature pay more attention to coordination and incentive of local government on economic growth than the nature of the multiple tasks. Based on moral hazard model with multiple tasks ,we analyzed the allocation of responsibilities between central ministries and local government. We found that the separation of the tasks between central and local government is more efficient when local government undertake serious conflicting task. Undertaking multitasks by local government is efficient when there are weak conflicting among tasks. The reform of government organization should not only stay on streamline the agency level ,it is more important to determine responsibilities based on the relation of multiple tasks.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期108-115,共8页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
辽宁大学亚洲研究中心的研究资助
国家自然科学基金资助项目"适应主体功能区规划实施的财政转移支付制度设计"(编号:70873099)的阶段性成果之一
关键词
地方政府
分权
多任务
Local Government
Decentralization
Multiple Tasks
