期刊文献+

我国资源类企业对外投资的有效性——基于合约理论的分析

Effects of Outward Investment of Our Resource Enterprises:Based on Contract Theory
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摘要 本文基于合约理论和国际外包的理论模型,探讨我国企业"走出去"建立合作公司的过程中,由所有权和销售权配置的不同导致"努力"水平、所有权和销售权配置及相关影响因素。研究发现,所有权与销售权的不同配置对于前期建设、加工及销售产生不尽相同的影响,而前期建设与加工环节之间的正外部性并不对掌握前期建设环节的一方获得相关权利产生积极作用。另外,在资源价格高企的情况下,我国应首先着力与市场完备程度较低地区的外国企业建立合作。 Basing on contract and outsourcing theory, the paper analyze the equilibrium allocation of rights of efforts, ownership and sale when Chinese energy finn cooperating with foreign firm by setting up Joint van- ture. We separate Joint venture' s production into initial construction, processing and sale. We infer that allocation of rights of ownership and sale has impact on initial construction and processing. An unexpected conclusion is "spillover" of initial construction on processing has no positive effect on cooperation partner who operate initial construction. In addition, Chinese firm had better cooperate with partner whose market cir-cumstance is still in developing when the prices of resources are comparative higher.
作者 罗云辉 林洁
出处 《财经科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第10期75-82,共8页 Finance & Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金课题(项目批准号:70603007)的阶段性成果 复旦大学"211"三期重点项目<中国产业的科学发展与自主创新> 复旦大学"985"二期<中国经济国际竞争力研究> 复旦大学文科推进计划项目的资助
关键词 所有权 销售权 合约 Property Right Right of Sale Contract
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参考文献6

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